Imperial Hubris Series

Imperial Hubris by Michael Scheuer, 2004, Excerpts

Al Qaeda attacks are terrifying, but acts of war are like that. Bin Laden is leading and inspiring a worldwide anti-U.S. insurgency. America is facing a talented, sturdy, charismatic, and determined enemy, one whose example and leadership is producing a growing threat to U.S. security from much of the Muslim world and not just the lunatic fringe. What the West sees as tragic brutality practiced by despairing or deviant individuals is perceived in much of the Muslim world as a heroic act of self-sacrifice, patriotism, and worship, an act to be greeted not with condemnation and revulsion, but with awe, respect, and a determination to emulate.

Al-Qaeda is an insurgent, vice terrorist, organization and has two primary, manpower-intensive missions: to provide quality insurgence training to Muslims from around the world, and to build an ample cadre of veteran fighters who can be sent foreign legion – like to serve as combat leaders, trainers, engineers, logisticians, financial advisors, or administrators wherever militant Islam needs them.

Pre 911, Al-Qaeda’s camps were staffed by veteran fighters who trained insurgents who fought, and trained others to fight, not only against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, but also against Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tajikistan, Egypt, Bosnia, western China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Philippines. Sunni Islamist groups have been running training camps in Yemen, Pakistan, Kashmir, Sudan, and the Philippines. More recently, since 1990, Somalia, Uzbekistan Montenegro, Eritrea, western China, Chechnya, Algeria, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, northern Iraq, and Albania can be added to the list.

The main function of the camps was and is to provide quality and uniform religious or paramilitary – or insurgent - training to young Muslims. The trainees learned how to use: AK-47s, Stinger missiles, GPS systems, advanced land navigation RPGs, map reading, demolition techniques, celestial navigation, hand-to-hand combat techniques, trench digging, weapon deployments, escape and evasion techniques, fist aid, scientific calculations to plot artillery fire, first aid, secure communications, et cetera.

It is safe to assume al Qaeda’s leaders began the dispersal process before the 11 September attack; bin Laden knew the attack date six days in advance, and had long wanted exactly the U.S. response the attacks generated. Because he wanted and expected U.S. ground forces to invade Afghanistan, bin Laden naturally would have spread his forces thin, sticking to the first rule of insurgency: never give the enemy a target that lets him defeat you in one campaign.

Al Qaeda has survived the U.S. military onslaught and is thriving militarily. More important, bin Laden has made long strides in focusing general anti-Western sentiments of Muslims specifically on the United States. This marks success for bin Laden’s incitement activities and is most apparent in the attacks by Islamist individuals or groups without known ties to al Qaeda. In an ironic twist, moreover, actions by the United States and its allies have increased the effectiveness and impact of al Qaeda’s efforts, leaving Washington confronted by a lose-lose situation almost every time it needs to make a decision vis-à-vis what it inaccurately describes as “the global war on terrorism.”