An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
The protection of property rights lay at the basis of the new system; however, there is in the Constitution no provision for property qualifications for voters or for elected officials and representatives. Only one branch of new government, the House of Representatives, was required to be elected by popular vote; and a safeguard was secured by the indirect process. Nearly all of the state constitutions then in force provided real or personal property qualifications for voters anyway, and radical democratic changes did not seem perilously near.
The House of Representatives springs from the mass of the people whom the states may see fit to enfranchise. The Senate is elected by the legislatures of the states, which were, in 1787, almost uniformly based on property qualifications. The President is to be chosen by electors selected by the legislatures. The judiciary is to be chosen by the President and the Senate, both removed from direct popular control and holding for longer terms than the House.
The taxing power was afforded the revenues that were to discharge the public debt in full. Provision was made for this discharge in Article VI to the effect that “All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be valid against the
Congress was given plenary power to raise and support military and naval force, for the defense of the country against foreign and domestic forces. These forces were to be at the disposal of the President in the execution of national laws; and to guard the states against renewed attempts of “desperate debtors” like Shays. The army and navy are considered by the authors of The Federalist as genuine economic instrumentalities.
These were the great powers conferred on the new government: taxation, war, commercial control, and disposition of western lands. Through them public creditors may be paid in full, domestic peace maintained, advantages obtained in dealing with foreign nations, manufactures protected, and the development of the territories go forward in full swing. Contracts are to be safe, and whoever engages in a financial operation, public or private, may know that state legislatures cannot destroy overnight the rules by which the game is played.
The most unequivocal printed criticism of the Constitution from the democratic point of view was that of “Lycurgus,” who posed as an aristocrat defending the Constitution. The House, he declared, was a pretended concession to democracy, but in reality it had little power, since it was checked by the Senate and by the President. It was elected for two years, with no provision for rotation, so the members would not have to mix with the citizens, would be under the eye of the aristocracy and would come to act like the aristocrats. The Senate was a house of gentlemen, serving for long terms, while the power of the President over the army, treaties, and appointments was appropriate to an aristocratic system. The state, left with little power, would be absorbed, while the Supreme Court would hear almost all questions and would help to put down any uprising. Finally, freedom of the press, of speech, and the right of habeas corpus would be denied. Altogether, for the aristocrats, the Constitution was ideal.
